EIOPA’s Insurance Stress Test 2018 Recommendations

Introduction

During the course of 2018, EIOPA carried out a European-wide stress test (ST) in accordance with Articles 21(2)(b) and 32 of Regulation (EU) 1094/2010 of 24 November 2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereafter the ‘Regulation’).

The Recommendations contained in this document are issued in accordance with Article 21(2)(b) of the Regulation in order to address issues identified in the stress test.

EIOPA will support National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and undertakings through guidance and other measures if needed.

The 2018 Stress Test results showed that on aggregate the insurance sector is sufficiently capitalised to absorb the combination of shocks prescribed in the three scenarios. However, it also confirms the significant sensitivity to market shocks for the European insurance sector with Groups being vulnerable

  • not only to low yields and longevity risk,
  • but also to a sudden and abrupt reversal of risk premia, combined with an instantaneous shock to lapse rates and claims inflation.

The exercise further reveals potential transmission channels of the tested shocks to insurers’ balance sheets. For instance, in the YCU scenario the assumed claim inflation shock leads to a net increase in the liabilities of those Groups more exposed to non-life business through claims inflation. Finally, both the YCD and YCU scenario have similar negative impact on post-stress SCR ratios.

As outlined in the Executive Summary of the 2018 Insurance Stress Test Report, further analyses of the results are required by EIOPA and the NCAs to obtain a deeper understanding of the risks and vulnerabilities of the sector.

In order to follow-up on the main vulnerabilities, EIOPA is issuing the present Recommendations related to the 2018 stress test exercise.

Recommendation 1
NCAs should strengthen the supervision of the Groups identified as facing greater exposure to Yield Curve Up and/or Yield Curve Down scenarios. This affects, in particular, those Groups where transitional measures have a greater impact.

Recommendation 2
NCAs should carefully review and, where necessary, challenge the capital and risk management strategies of the affected Groups. In particular:

  • NCAs should require Groups to clarify the impact of the stress test in terms of capital and risk management.
  • For the affected Groups, stress test scenarios similar to YCU and YCD should be properly considered in the risk management framework, including the ORSAs.
  • Review the risk appetite framework for the affected Groups.

Recommendation 3
NCAs should evaluate the potential management actions to be implemented by the affected Groups. In particular:

  • NCAs should require Groups to indicate the range of actions based on the results of the stress testing.
  • NCAs should assess if the actions identified are realistic in such stress scenarios.
  • NCAs should consider any eventual second-round effects.

Recommendation 4
NCAs should further contribute to enhance the stress test process.

Recommendation 5
NCAs should enhance cooperation and information exchange with other relevant Authorities, such as the ECB/SSM or other national authorities, concerning the stress test results of the affected insurers which form part of a financial conglomerate.

EIOPA ST

Click here to access EIOPA’s Recommendations

EIOPA’s Supervisory Statement Solvency II: Application of the proportionality principle in the supervision of the Solvency Capital Requirement

EIOPA identified potential divergences in the supervisory practices concerning the supervision of the SCR calculation of immaterial sub-modules.

EIOPA agrees that in case of immaterial SCR sub-modules the principle of proportionality applies regarding the supervisory review process, but considers it is important to guarantee supervisory convergence as divergent approaches could lead to supervisory arbitrage.

EIOPA is of the view that the consistent implementation of the proportionality principle is a key element to ensure supervisory convergence for the supervision of the SCR. For this purpose the following key areas should be considered:

Proportionate approach

Supervisory authorities may allow undertakings, when calculating the SCR at the individual undertaking level, to adopt a proportionate approach towards immaterial SCR sub-modules, provided that the undertaking concerned is able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the supervisory authorities that:

  1. the amount of the SCR sub-module is immaterial when compared with the total basic SCR (BSCR);
  2. applying a proportionate approach is justifiable taking into account the nature and complexity of the risk;
  3. the pattern of the SCR sub-module is stable over the last three years;
  4. such amount/pattern is consistent with the business model and the business strategy for the following years; and
  5. undertakings have in place a risk management system and processes to monitor any evolution of the risk, either triggered by internal sources or by an external source that could affect the materiality of a certain submodule.

This approach should not be used when calculating SCR at group level.

An SCR sub-module should be considered immaterial for the purposes of the SCR calculation when its amount is not relevant for the decision-making process or the judgement of the undertaking itself or the supervisory authorities. Following this principle, even if materiality needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, EIOPA recommends that materiality is assessed considering the weight of the sub-modules in the total BSCR and

  • that each sub-module subject to this approach should not represent more than 5% of the BSCR
  • or all sub-modules should not represent more than 10% of the BSCR.

For immaterial SCR sub-modules supervisory authorities may allow undertakings not to perform a full recalculation of such a sub-module on a yearly basis taking into consideration the complexity and burden that such a calculation would represent when compared to the result of the calculation.

Prudent calculation

For the sub-modules identified as immaterial, a calculation of the SCR submodule using inputs prudently estimated and leading to prudent outcomes should be performed at the time of the decision to adopt a proportionate approach. Such calculation should be subject to the consent of the supervisory authority.

The result of such a calculation may then be used in principle for the next three years, after which a full calculation using inputs prudently estimated is required so that the immateriality of the sub-module and the risk-based and proportionate approach is re-assessed.

During the three-year period the key function holder of the actuarial function should express an opinion to the administrative, management or supervisory body of the undertaking on the outcome of immaterial sub-module used for calculating SCR.

Risk management system and ORSA

Such a system should be proportionate to the risks at stake while ensuring a proper monitoring of any evolution of the risk, either triggered by internal sources such as a change in the business model or business strategy or by an external source such as an exceptional event that could affect the materiality of a certain sub-module.

Such a monitoring should include the setting of qualitative and quantitative early warning indicators (EWI), to be defined by the undertaking and embedded in the ORSA processes.

Supervisory reporting and public disclosure

Undertakings should include information on the risk management system in the ORSA Report. Undertakings should include structured information on the sub-modules for which a proportionate approach is applied in the Regular Supervisory Reporting and in the Solvency and Financial Condition Report (SFCR), under the section “E.2 Capital Management – Solvency Capital Requirement and Minimum Capital Requirement”.

Supervisory review process

The approach should be implemented in the context of on-going supervisory dialogue, meaning that the supervisory authority should be satisfied and agree with the approach taken and be kept informed in case of any material change. Supervisory authorities should inform the undertakings in case there is any concern with the approach. In case the supervisory authority has any concern the approach should not be implemented or might be implemented with additional safeguards as agreed between the supervisory authority and the undertaking.

In some situations supervisory authorities may require a full calculation following the requirements of the Delegated Regulation and using inputs prudently estimated.

Example : Supervisory reporting and public disclosure

Undertakings should include information on the risk management system referred to in the previous paragraphs in the ORSA Report.

Undertakings should include structured information on the sub-modules for which a proportionate approach is applied in the Regular Supervisory Reporting, under the section “E.2 Capital Management – Solvency Capital Requirement and Minimum Capital Requirement” (RSR), including at least the following information:

  1. identification of the sub-module(s) for which a proportionate approach was applied;
  2. amount of the SCR for such a sub-module in the last three years before the application of proportionate approach, including the current year;
  3. the date of the last calculation performed following the requirements of the Delegated Regulation using inputs prudently estimated; and
  4. early warning indicators identified and triggers for a calculation following the requirements of the Delegated Regulation and using inputs prudently estimated.

Undertakings should also include structured information on the sub-modules for which a proportionate approach is applied in the Solvency and Financial Condition Report, under the section “E.2 Capital Management – Solvency Capital Requirement and Minimum Capital Requirement” (SFCR), including at least the identification of the submodule(s) for which a proportionate calculation was applied.

An example of structured information to be included in the regular supervisory report in line with Article 311(6) of the Delegated Regulation is as follows:

Proportionality EIOPA

This proportionate approach should also be reflected in the quantitative reporting templates to be submitted. In this case the templates would reflect the amounts used for the last full calculation performed.

Click here to access EIOPA’s Supervisory Statement

Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Policy in Insurance (EIOPA)

In its work, EIOPA followed a step-by-step approach seeking to address the following questions in a sequential way:

  1. Does insurance create or amplify systemic risk?
  2. If yes, what are the tools already existing in the Solvency II framework, and how do they contribute to mitigate the sources of systemic risk?
  3. Are other tools needed and, if yes, which ones could be promoted?

Each paper published addresses one of the questions above. The publication of the three EIOPA papers on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance has constituted an important milestone by which EIOPA has defined its policy stance and laid down its initial ideas on several relevant topics.

This work should now be turned into a specific policy proposal for additional macroprudential tools or measures where relevant and possible as part of the review of Directive 2009/138/EC (the ‘Solvency II5 Review’). For this purpose, and in order to gather the views of stakeholders, EIOPA is publishing this Discussion Paper on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance, which focuses primarily on the third paper, i.e. on potential new tools and measures. Special attention is devoted to the four tools and measures specifically highlighted in the recent European Commission’s Call for Advice to EIOPA.

The financial crisis has shown the need to further consider the way in which systemic risk is created and/or amplified, as well as the need to have proper policies in place to address those risks. So far, most of the discussions on macroprudential policy have focused on the banking sector due to its prominent role in the recent financial crisis.

Given the relevance of the topic, EIOPA initiated the publication of a series of three papers on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance with the aim of contributing to the debate and ensuring that any extension of this debate to the insurance sector reflects the specific nature of the insurance business.

EIOPA followed a step-by-step approach, seeking to address the following questions:

  • Does insurance create or amplify systemic risk? In the first paper entitled ‘Systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance’, EIOPA identified and analysed the sources of systemic risk in insurance and proposed a specific macroprudential framework for the sector. If yes, what are the tools already existing in the current framework, and how do they contribute to mitigate the sources of systemic risk? In the second paper, ‘Solvency II tools with macroprudential impact’, EIOPA identified, classified and provided a preliminary assessment of the tools or measures already existing within the Solvency II framework, which could mitigate any of the systemic risk sources that were previously identified.
  • Are other tools needed and, if yes, which ones could be promoted? The third paper carried out an initial assessment of other potential tools or measures to be included in a macroprudential framework designed for insurers. EIOPA focused on four categories of tools (capital and reservingbased tools, liquidity-based tools, exposure-based tools and pre-emptive planning). The paper focuses on whether a specific instrument should or should not be further considered. This is an important aspect in light of future work in the context of the Solvency II review.

The publication of the three EIOPA papers on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance constitutes an important milestone by which EIOPA has defined its policy stance and laid down its initial ideas on several relevant topics. It should be noted that the ESRB (2018) has also identified a shortlist of options for additional provisions, measures and instruments, which reaches broadly similar conclusions as EIOPA.

EIOPA’s work should now be turned into a specific policy proposal for additional macroprudential tools or measures where relevant and possible as part of the Solvency II Review. For this purpose, and in order to gather the views of stakeholders, EIOPA is publishing this Discussion Paper on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance.

This Discussion paper is based on the three papers previously published. They therefore back its content. Interested readers are recommended to consult them for further information or details. Relevant references are included in each of the sections.

EIOPA has included questions on all three papers. The majority of the questions, however, revolve around the third paper on additional tools or measures, which is more relevant in light of the Solvency II review.

The Discussion paper primarily focuses on the “principles” of each tool, trying to explain their rationale. As such, it does not address the operational aspects/challenges of each tool (e.g. calibration, thresholds, etc.) in a comprehensive manner. Similar to the approach followed with other legislative initiatives, the technical details could be addressed by means of technical standards, guidelines or recommendations, once the relevant legal instrument has been enacted.

Definitions

EIOPA provided all relevant definitions in EIOPA (2018a). It has to be noted, however, that there is usually no unique or universal definition for all these concepts. EIOPA’s work did not seek to fill this gap. Instead, working definitions are put forward in order to set the scene and should therefore be considered in the context of this paper only.

  • Financial stability and systemic risk are two strongly related concepts. Financial stability can be defined as a state whereby the build-up of systemic risk is prevented.
  • Systemic risk means a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy.
  • Macroprudential policy should be understood as a framework that aims at mitigating systemic risk (or the build-up thereof), thereby contributing to the ultimate objective of the stability of the financial system and, as a result, the broader implications for economic growth.
  • Macroprudential instruments are qualitative or quantitative tools or measures with system-wide impact that relevant competent authorities (i.e. authorities in charge of preserving the stability of the financial system) put in place with the aim of achieving financial stability.

In the context of this paper, these concepts (i.e. tools, instruments and measures) are used as synonyms.

The macroprudential policy approach contributes to the stability of the financial system — together with other policies (e.g. monetary and fiscal) as well as with microprudential policies. Whereas microprudential policies primarily focus on individual entities, the macroprudential approach focuses on the financial system as a whole.

It should be taken into account that, in some cases, the borders between microprudential policies and macroprudential consequences are blurring. That means, for example, that instruments that may have been designed as microprudential instrument may also have macroprudential consequences.

There are different institutional models for the implementation of macroprudential policies across EU, in some cases involving different parties (e.g. ministries, supervisors, etc.). This paper adopts a neutral approach by referring to the generic concept of the ‘relevant authority in charge of the macroprudential policy’, which should encompass the different institutional models existing across jurisdictions. Sometimes a simplified term such as ‘the authorities’ or ‘the competent authorities’ is used.

Systemic risk in insurance

While a common understanding of the systemic relevance of the banking sector has been reached, the issue is still debated in the case of the insurance sector. In order to contribute to this debate, EIOPA developed a conceptual approach to illustrate the dynamics in which systemic risk in insurance can be created or amplified.

Main elements of EIOPA’s conceptual approach to systemic risk

  • Triggering event: Exogenous event that has an impact on one or several insurance companies and may initiate the whole process of systemic risk creation. Examples are macroeconomic factors (e.g. raising unemployment), financial factors (e.g. yield movements) or non-financial factors (e.g. demographic changes or cyber-attacks).
  • Company risk profile: The result of the collection of activities performed by the insurance company. The activities will determine: a) the specific features of the company reflecting the strategic and operational decisions taken; and b) the risk factors that the company is exposed to, i.e. the potential vulnerabilities of the company.
  • Systemic risk drivers: Elements that may enable the generation of negative spill-overs from one or more company-specific stresses into a systemic effect, i.e. they may turn a company specific-stress into a system wide stress.
  • Transmission channels. Contagion channels that explain the process by which the sources of systemic risk may affect financial stability and/or the real economy. EIOPA distinguishes five main transmission channels: a) Exposure channel; b) Asset liquidation channel; c) Lack of supply of insurance products; d) Bank-like channel; and e) Expectations and information asymmetries
  • Sources of systemic risk: they result from the systemic risk drivers and their transmission channels. They are direct or indirect externalities whereby insurance imposes a systemic threat to the wider system. These direct and indirect externalities lead to three potential sources’ categories of systemic risks which are not mutually exclusive, i.e. entity-based related source, activity-based related source and behaviour-based related source.

In essence and as depicted in Figure 1, the approach developed by EIOPA considers that a ‘triggering event’ initially has an impact at entity level, affecting one or more insurers through their ‘risk profile’. Potential individual or collective distresses may generate systemic implications, the relevance of which is determined by the presence of different ‘systemic risk drivers’ embedded in the insurance companies.

EIOPA Sys Risk

In EIOPA’s view, systemic events could be generated in two ways.

  1. The ‘direct’ effect, originated by the failure of a systemically relevant insurer or the collective failure of several insurers generating a cascade effect. This systemic source is defined as ‘entity-based’.
  2. The ‘indirect’ effect, in which possible externalities are enhanced by engagement in potentially systemic activities (activity-based sources) or the widespread common reactions of insurers to exogenous shocks (behaviour-based source).

Potential externalities generated via direct and indirect sources are transferred to the rest of the financial system and to the real economy via specific channels (i.e. the transmission channel) and could induce changes in the risk profile of insurers, eventually generating potential second-round effects.

The following table provides an overview of possible examples of triggering events, risk profile, systemic risk drivers and transmission channels. It should therefore not be considered as a comprehensive list of elements.

EIOPA MacroPrud

Potential macroprudential tools and measures to enhance the current framework

In its third paper, EIOPA (2018c) carried out an analysis focusing on four categories of tools:

a) Capital and reserving-based tools;

b) Liquidity-based tools;

c) Exposure-based tools; and

d) Pre-emptive planning.

EIOPA also considers whether the tools should be used for enhanced reporting and monitoring or as intervention power. Following this preliminary analysis, EIOPA concluded the following :

EIOPA Other tools

Example: Enhancement of the ORSA 

Description. In an ORSA, an insurer is required to consider all material risks that may have an impact on its ability to meet its obligations to policyholders. In doing this a forward looking perspective is also required. Although conceived at first as a microprudential tool, this tool could be enhanced to take the macroprudential perspective also into account.

Potential contribution to mitigate systemic risk. The enhancement of ORSA could help in mitigating two of the sources of systemic risk identified.

Proposal. This measure is proposed for further consideration for enhanced reporting and monitoring purposes.

Operational aspects. A description of all relevant operational aspects is carried out in EIOPA (2018c). In essence, the idea is to supplement the microprudential approach by assigning certain roles and responsibilities to the relevant authority in charge of the macroprudential policy (see Figure below). This authority could carry out three different tasks:

  1. Aggregation of information;
  2. Analysis of the information; and
  3. Provision of certain information or parameters to supervisors to channel macroprudential concerns.

Supervisors would then request undertakings to include in their ORSAs particular macroprudential risks.

Issues for consideration: In order to make the ORSA operational from a macroprudential point of view, the following would be needed:

  • A clarification of the role of the risk management function in order to include macroprudential concerns.
  • The inclusion of a new paragraph in Article 45 of the Solvency II directive explicitly referring to the macroprudential dimension and the need to consider the macroeconomic situation and potential sources of systemic risk as followup of their assessment on whether the company complies on a continuous basis with the Solvency II regulatory capital requirements.
  • Clarification that a follow-up is expected after input from supervisors, namely from authorities in charge of the macroprudential policy. On a risk-based approach this might imply the request of specific information in terms of nature, scope, format and point in time, where justified by likelihood or impact of materialisation of a certain source of systemic risk.

Furthermore, a certain level of harmonisation of the structure and content of the ORSA report would be needed, which would enable the identification of the relevant sections by the authorities in charge of macroprudential policies. This, however, would mean a change in the current approach followed with regard to the ORSA.

Click here to access EIOPA’s detailed Discussion Paper 2019

 

EIOPA: Potential macroprudential tools and measures to enhance the current insurance regulatory framework

The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) initiated in 2017 the publication of a series of papers on systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance. So far, most of the discussions concerning macroprudential policy have focused on the banking sector. The aim of EIOPA is to contribute to the debate, whilst taking into consideration the specific nature of the insurance business.

With this purpose, EIOPA has followed a step-by-step approach, seeking to address the following questions:

  • Does insurance create or amplify systemic risk?
  • If yes, what are the tools already existing in the current framework, and how do they contribute to mitigate the sources of systemic risk?
  • Are other tools needed and, if yes, which ones could be promoted?

While the two first questions were addressed in previous papers, the purpose of the present paper is to identify, classify and provide a preliminary assessment of potential additional tools and measures to enhance the current framework in the EU from a macroprudential perspective.

EIOPA carried out an analysis focusing on four categories of tools:

  1. Capital and reserving-based tools;
  2. Liquidity-based tools;
  3. Exposure-based tools; and
  4. Pre-emptive planning.

EIOPA also considers whether the tools should be used for enhanced reporting and monitoring or as intervention power. Following this preliminary analysis, EIOPA concludes the following (Table 1):

Table 1 Macro

It is important to stress that the paper essentially focuses on whether a specific instrument should or should not be further considered. This is an important aspect in light of future work in the context of the Solvency II review. As such, this work should be understood as a first step of the process and not as a formal proposal yet. Furthermore, EIOPA is aware that the implementation of tools also has important challenges. In this respect this report provides an overview of tools, main conclusions and observations, stressing also the main challenges.

Table 2 puts together the findings of all three papers published by EIOPA by linking

  1. sources of systemic risk and operational objectives (first paper),
  2. tools already available in the current framework (second paper)
  3. and other potential tools and measures to be further considered (current paper).

Table 2 Papers

The first paper, ‘Systemic risk and macroprudential policy in insurance’ aimed at identifying and analysing the sources of systemic risk in insurance from a conceptual point of view and at developing a macroprudential framework specifically designed for the insurance sector.

The second paper, ‘Solvency II tools with macroprudential impact’, identified, classified and provided a preliminary assessment of the tools or measures already existing within the Solvency II framework, which could mitigate any of the sources of systemic risk.

This third paper carries out an initial assessment of potential tools or measures to be included in a macroprudential framework designed for insurers, in order to mitigate the sources of systemic risk and contribute to the achievement of the operational objectives.

It covers six main issues:

  1. Identification of potential new instruments/measures. The tools will be grouped according to the following blocks:
    • Capital and reserving-based tools
    • Liquidity-based tools
    • Exposure-based tools
    • Pre-emptive planning
  2. Way in which the tools in each block contribute to achieving one or more of the operational objectives identified in previous papers.
  3. Interaction with Solvency II.
  4. Individual description of all the tools identified for each of the blocks. The following classification will be considered:
    • Enhanced reporting and monitoring tools and measures. They provide supervisors and other authorities with additional relevant information about potential risks and vulnerabilities that are or could be building up in the system. Authorities could then implement an array of measures to address them both at micro and macroprudential level (see annex for an inventory of powers potentially available to national supervisory authorities (NSAs)).
    • Intervention powers. These powers are currently not available as macroprudential tools. They are more intrusive and intervene more severely in the management of the companies. Examples could be additional buffers, limits or restrictions. They are only justified where the existing measures may not suffice to address the sources of systemic risk identified.
  5. Preliminary analysis per tool.
  6. Preliminary conclusion.

Four initial remarks should be made.

  1. First, although in several instances the measures and instruments are originally microprudential in nature, they could also be implemented as macroprudential instruments, if a systemically important institution or set of institutions or the whole market are targeted.
  2. Secondly, analysing potential changes on the long-term guarantees (LTG) measures and measures on equity risk that were introduced in the Solvency II directive, although out of the scope of this paper, could contribute to further enhance the framework from a macroprudential perspective. The focus of this paper is essentially on new tools, leaving aside the analysis of potential changes in the current LTG measures and measures on equity risk, which will be carried out in the context of the Solvency II review by 1 January 2021.
  3. Thirdly, when used as a macroprudential tool, the decision process may differ, given that there are different institutional models for the implementation of macroprudential policies across EU countries, in some cases involving different parties (e.g. ministries, supervisors, etc.). This paper seeks to adopt a neutral approach by referring to the concept of the ‘relevant authority in charge of the macroprudential authority’, which should encompass the different institutional models existing across jurisdictions.
  4. Fourthly, there seems to be no single solution when it comes to the level of application of each tool (single vs. group level).

Concerning the different proposed monitoring tools, in the follow-up work, the structure and content of the additional data requirements should be defined. This should then be followed by an assessment of the potential burden of collecting this information from undertakings.

It is important to stress that this paper essentially focuses on whether a specific instrument should or should not be further considered. This is an important aspect in light of future work in the context of the Solvency II review. As such, this work should be understood as a first step of the process and not as a formal proposal yet.

Figure ORSA

Click here to access EIOPA’s detailed discussion paper

EIOPA Risk Dashboard January 2018

Risks originating from the macroeconomic environment remained stable and high. Improvements have been observed across most indicators, but were not sufficient to change the overall risk picture. The improving prospects for economic growth still contrast with the persistence of structural imbalances, such as fiscal deficit. The accommodative stance of monetary policy has been reduced only very gradually, with low interest rates continuing to put a strain on the insurance sector.

Credit risks remained constant at a medium level whereas observed spreads continued to decline. The average rating of investments has seen some marginal improvements. Concerns on the pricing of the risk premia remain.

Market risks remained stable at a medium level despite a reduction of the volatility on prices was observed. Only price to book value of European stocks moved in the direction of risk increase.

Liquidity and funding risks were constant at a medium level in 2017 Q3 and remained a minor issue for insurers. Catastrophe bond issuance significantly decreased when compared to the record high registered during the previous quarter. The low volume of issued bonds made the indicator less relevant.

Profitability and solvency risks remained stable at a medium level. A deterioration of the net combined ratio was observed in the tail (90 percentile) of the distribution mainly populated by reinsurers in this quarter. SCR ratios have improved across all types of insurers mainly due to an increase of the Eligible Own Funds. This has been especially marked for life solo companies.

Interlinkages & imbalances: Risks in this category remained constant at a medium level. Investment exposures to banks and other insurers increased slightly from the previous quarter.

Insurance risks increased when compared to 2017 Q2 and are now at a medium level. This was essentially driven by the significant increase in the catastrophe loss ratio resulting from the impact of the catastrophic events observed in Q3 mainly on reinsurers’ technical results. This is also reflected in the loss ratio. Other indicators in this risk category still point to a stable risk exposure.

Market perceptions remained constant, with the improvement in external rating outlooks outweighing the observed increase in price to earnings ratios. Insurance stocks slightly outperformed the market, especially for life insurance, and CDS spreads reduced.

Riskdashboard 12018

Click here to access EIOPA’s Risk Dashboard January 2018

How to successfully mitigate your organization’s third-party risk

What Is Third-Party Risk Management & Third-Party Due Diligence?

Third-party risk management is the process of assessing and controlling reputational, financial and legal risks to your organization posed by parties outside your organization. Third-party due diligence is the investigative process by which a third party is reviewed to determine any potential concerns involving legal, financial or reputational risks. Due diligence is disciplined activity that includes reviewing, monitoring and managing communication over the entire vendor engagement life cycle.

The Risks Are Real

As we see in the news too often, lapses in leadership around managing third parties have damaged organizations by exposing them to massive fines and penalties. According to the 2016 Benchmark Report, one-third of respondent organizations have faced legal or regulatory issues that involved third parties, with 50 percent of these involving average costs per incident of $10,000 or more. Even if the financial penalty can be managed, the reputational impact can have far-reaching consequences for many years. Third-party risk management is a top concern of compliance leaders, but many organizations are still coming to terms with how best to manage their third parties to limit risk and develop programs based on organizational risk assessments. The 2016 NAVEX Global benchmark report found that many organizations think they could be doing a better job of third-party risk management. Only 58 percent reported that they do a good job of complying with laws and regulations, and less than 25 percent rate their overall program as Good. Organizations may be diligent with their ethics and compliance programs, but for many the risk their third parties represent is a Wild West over which they feel like they have little control.

Benefits of a Strong Third-Party Risk Management Program

Managing third-party risk can make a big difference inhow well your organization can identify, manage and limit the liability a third party can represent. Your third party’s risk is your risk. You should have confidence that your program is minimizing that risk for you and your organization.

TPRClick here to access NAVEX detailed guide